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Introduction 
As we all know, Vancouver and the Lower Mainland have a remarkable history of 
regional governance and planning. Indeed, there may perhaps be no better place in 
which to ponder what is a very old dilemma—how to govern and plan the expanding 
urban region. 
 
The title that frames this conference is “rethinking the region.” The notion that the 
region needs to be rethought betrays a certain malaise, I think. Is the region—or, 
more particularly, Vancouver’s brand of regionalism—truly in need of rethinking? Is 
Metro Vancouver at a crossroads, or merely experiencing a moment of self-doubt—a 
blip in what has been a very long-term trajectory of success? 
 
The task I have set for myself today is to reflect on the sources of Lower Mainland’s 
relative success. Without giving away my punchline, my conclusion is that Greater 
Vancouver’s regional governance is as healthy as it has ever been. The problem, it 
seems to me, lies with the province, which has not done enough to enable and 
support regional choices.   
 
At the dawn of the postwar period this 
was much like any other North 
American urban region of similar size 
and age. Outside of the City of 
Vancouver, urban development was 
largely unregulated. Ribbon 
development extended out like vines into 
Surrey, Langley, and beyond. Patchy 
subdivision splayed south across the 
Fraser and eastwards into the agricultural 
lands of the valley. Large residential 
zones remained serviced by septic tanks 
rather than trunk sewers, not only at the fringe, but in the core as well. There was no 
relationship between servicing and subdivision control. 
 
In 1961, the authors of a Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board report could write 
that: 
“The spread of Greater Vancouver … consists of city-type houses on 
city-size lots, sprinkled about the countryside. … It can best be 
described as little bits of city in the wrong place. … With only 750 square 
miles of usable land in the Lower Mainland the sprawl belt 
encompasses around 100 square miles.” 
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Today, after 60 years of incremental development of institutions and implementation 
of policies, we see a quite different metropolis. Urban areas are fully serviced by trunk 
water and sewer infrastructure. Policy has enforced a strict separation between urban 
and non-urban land uses, and the “sprawl belt” of 1961 is being filled in.  
 
Vancouver is the only North American region in which the rate of rural land 
consumption is less than that of population growth. Instead of flattening, as 
elsewhere, the density gradient from core to periphery is becoming steeper. 
Densification has occurred not only through brownfield redevelopment, but also 
through the broad-based redevelopment of established residential areas. Indeed, the 
size of the region’s single-detached housing stock is decreasing in absolute terms.  
 
We can debate the substance of these goals and their economic, social, and 
environmental effects. But the fact remains that Lower Mainlanders chose their 
future. They—you—made this happen. There was nothing automatic about it.  
 
So how did local actors devise and implement a coherent land-use policy over an 
extended period of time to a degree that has eluded almost every other urban region 
in North America?  
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To answer this question, I will lay out a framework through which we can 
understand the legitimacy of the regional perspective on governance. Indeed, I will 
argue that creating and sustaining legitimacy is the core problem of regional 
governance. 
 
Without legitimacy, there is no influence. There is no capacity to act. Legitimate 
authorities tend to be effective because their subjects more often than not go along 
with their decisions, plans, or frameworks. Authorities seen as illegitimate tend to be 
ineffective, because their subjects engage in resistance or subversion. The cultivation 
and maintenance of legitimacy is a dynamic and often conflictual process, one that 
requires constant reinvention and renewal of champions.  
 
I will first discuss why regionalism struggles for legitimacy. I will then interpret the 
development of regional governance in Greater Vancouver as a struggle for 
legitimacy, making a comparison with Portland, Oregon. And finally, I will offer 
some commentary on the present situation.  
Perspectives on governance:  
Regionalism, localism, sovereignty 
Legitimacy is the core problem of regionalism because the regional perspective on 
governance is at a systemic political disadvantage relative to other perspectives whose 
legitimacy is more entrenched.  
 
So what competes with regionalism? 
 
The first competitor is localism. The belief in community self-determination is 
deeply embedded in Anglo-American political culture. While limited in its capacities 
and activities, local government is often portrayed as the building block of 
democracy, its institutions the closest and most accessible to the people.  
 
Localist rhetoric pervades debates. Here are two examples that could have been said 
yesterday, but in fact were uttered during the development of the Lower Mainland 
Regional Planning Board’s 1966 Official Regional Plan.  
 
• “All we want is to be left alone, but you won’t let us.” Reeve Simpson of 
Chilliwack 
 
• “The council … is elected by the residents of today and not by future 
generations, and must give consideration to the wishes of those who elected 
them.” Langley District Councillor Bill Blair 
 
This is the essence of localism: accountability through home rule.  
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The second competing perspective is what we might call sovereignty. The federal 
and provincial governments are sovereign powers, their authority derived from the 
founding constitutional documents. While distant from the people, sovereignty is the 
ultimate collective expression of the popular will, and the building block of the 
international system. 
 
Regionalism is the notion that some problems can only be solved at scale that lies 
between these two scales—between the local and the sovereign.  
 
The regional idea has always emerged to address this governance gap that neither 
local nor higher-level governments can fill because they lack the jurisdiction, 
capacity, or electoral incentive to do so.  
 
Viewed historically, we see that the 
localist and sovereign perspectives 
predate regionalism by many 
centuries. The modern nation-state 
has been around for half a 
millennium. The self-governing 
municipal corporation goes back even 
further. Sovereign and local 
institutions are mature and their legal 
status secure. Regionalism is the new 
kid on the block, emerging only with industrialization and urbanization in the 
nineteenth century.  
 
How then can regionalism elbow its way in to find a legitimate role in a political 
space that is monopolized by local and sovereign authorities? 
Sources of legitimacy: Input, output, throughput 
To answer this question, we must understand where legitimacy comes from. If we 
know where it comes from, we can think about how to redesign institutions and 
reorient organizational behaviours to reinforce the legitimacy of the regional 
perspective. 
 
Political scientist Fritz Scharpf proposes that there are three types of legitimacy, each 
of which is derived from a different source. 
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The first is input legitimacy. This is about representation—how decision-making 
bodies are constituted—by direct election or indirectly, by delegates of other elected 
bodies. In our political culture, directly elected bodies are typically viewed as more 
legitimate than ones that are appointed.  
 
The second is output legitimacy, which stems from perceptions of performance. 
Stakeholders will confer legitimacy on institutions and policies if they benefit from 
the results.  
 
The third type, throughput legitimacy, accrues from perceptions of the processes 
that link inputs and outputs: accountability for decisions, transparency of decision-
making, efficiency of operations, and fair treatment of stakeholders.  
 
Let’s compare regional institutions to 
provincial and local ones so we can 
better understand the nature of the 
legitimacy disadvantage and, on this 
basis, see how it may be overcome.  
 
On the input side, provincial and local 
governments are directly elected, which 
creates a focus for political 
accountability through the electoral 
process.  
 
On the output side, provincial and local governments also deliver programs and 
operate infrastructure systems that are visible to individuals, households, and 
businesses.  
 
Turning to throughput legitimacy, we know that provincial and local institutions 
receive greater media scrutiny than regional ones. They are also subject to systematic 
independent audit, and they are legally required to inform and consult stakeholders 
and the general public.  
 
By contrast, most regional institutions, including British Columbia’s regional 
districts, the former Metro Toronto, and American councils of governments, function 
at a remove from individuals, households, and businesses. Whether they are 
structured as federations of municipalities or agencies of senior governments, their 
decision-making bodies are composed of delegates or appointees of other 
governments. In this sense, they have less input legitimacy than local and sovereign 
governments.  
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On the output side, regional institutions that manage infrastructure systems tend to 
be structured as wholesalers rather than retailers of services. While local and 
provincial governments provide services and benefits directly to individuals, 
households, and firms, regional authorities often work through local governments. 
While Metro Vancouver operates trunk water and sewer services, this role is invisible 
to property owners because they purchase services from municipal utilities. 
 
While regional bodies often make long-term land-use and infrastructure plans, they 
rarely have the power to implement them through regulation. From the Lower 
Mainland Regional Planning Board through to Metro Vancouver, regional planning 
has taken the form of articulating goals, principles, and a schematic land-use concept 
that is given effect by local governments through official community plans and 
zoning bylaws. 
 
All of this illustrates that regional ideas, and regional institutions, often occupy a 
precarious space. Regionalism is sandwiched between, and often squeezed out, by 
local and provincial authorities that draw input legitimacy from direct election, and 
output legitimacy from the services they deliver directly to residents and businesses. 
 
Simply, regional institutions don’t get credit, or blame, for their work because they 
rarely touch individuals and businesses directly.  
Legitimizing regionalism 
So where does this leave regionalism? Given this position of disadvantage, from 
where can regional governance draw legitimacy? 
 
Short of the provincial government 
taking on direct authority for regional 
land-use and infrastructure planning 
and service delivery, as occurs in 
Australian states, or consolidating local 
governments to create a region-wide 
single-tier municipality, I see little 
potential to fundamentally alter 
perceptions of the input and output 
legitimacy of regional institutions.  
 
Indeed, there are may be very good 
reasons for regional authorities to operate at a remove. Staying out of the parcel-by-
parcel weeds may help maintain a clear focus on the long-term planning and 
management of regional systems.  
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Direct election is one solution, but it may hurt as much as it helps.  
 
Switching to direct election in 1988 was supposed to reinforce Metro Toronto’s 
legitimacy. Instead, it removed the constituent municipalities’ stake in metropolitan 
questions, generating new conflicts between them and Metro.  
 
If we examine the history of North American regionalism closely, we find that the 
greatest potential for increasing the legitimacy of regional planning lies in the 
throughput dimension, and in particular the way regional institutions cultivate and 
manage relationships with organized stakeholders, and with the public at large, 
building trust and durable support coalitions along the way.  
 
 
Vancouver and Portland 
Let me now compare the stories of Vancouver and Portland. Both, as we know, are 
regarded as the most successful regional planning agencies in North America. The 
two regions make for a good comparison because they share important 
characteristics: 
 
• Similar population size and growth rates throughout the postwar period 
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• A constrained physical environment in which there is direct conflict between 
urbanization, agriculture, and natural resource extraction 
• A populist, polarized political culture that values local autonomy and private 
property rights 
In both places the legitimacy of regional planning was painstakingly constructed, bit 
by bit, in an unlikely and inhospitable environment. This occurred through strategic 
interaction with other actors—local governments, advocacy groups, and the public at 
large. 
 
Now, importantly, we must recognize that Portland Metro and Metro Vancouver are 
quite different regional institutions. Both create long-range urban growth strategies, 
yet only Metro Vancouver operates infrastructure systems. While Portland Metro is 
directly elected and has no institutional relationship with local government, Metro 
Vancouver’s boards are made up delegates from municipal councils.  
 
In both places, transit services are operated by independent bodies. In Portland, 
transportation planning is led by Portland Metro, not TriMet, whereas in Vancouver 
it is done by Translink.  
 
Their success at shaping urban development despite their very different institutional 
structures suggests that there is no one best way to organize regional governance.  
 
The basis of regional institutions’ capacity to shape urban development is not so 
much a matter of inputs (the nature of political representation) or outputs (service 
delivery performance) as it is a matter of throughput—the cultivation of relationships 
and external support.  
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The Vancouver story 
Let’s first turn to the Vancouver story. 
 
The origin of inter-municipal 
collaboration in Greater Vancouver 
is the province’s creation, at 
municipal request, of the Greater 
Vancouver Sewerage and Drainage 
District in 1913. Vancouver’s original 
sewer system failed early in the 20th 
century. As the drainage areas 
crossed local government 
boundaries, the chief engineers of 
Vancouver and its smaller 
neighbours jointly hired Montreal 
engineer RS Lea to study how to 
solve the emerging public health crisis.  
 
Lea designed not only a sewer system, but also an institution to manage it, structured 
as a federation of municipalities.  
 
The province supported this bureaucratic project by incorporating the board and 
guaranteeing its long-term debt. A water supply board was later piggybacked onto it 
in 1924. Due to Lea’s flexible design, whereby municipalities paid in in proportion to 
their share of regional tax assessment, the two boards expanded to include additional 
municipalities as urbanization spread outwards. With modification, this was the 
template for the regional districts when they were created in the 1960s. 
 
Importantly, these districts brought municipal politicians and staff into routine 
interaction with each other, engendering trust and compromise. 
 
While ordinary people were likely unaware of these bodies, municipal leaders saw 
them as legitimate actors, supporting their work and their expansion over time.  
 
After the war, the province enabled the creation of inter-municipal regional planning 
boards. The Lower Mainland Board was created in 1949. Similar to the sewer and 
water boards, it was structured as a federation of the region’s 28 municipalities. By 
1952, it was fully up and running with a full-time executive director, the late Jim 
Wilson. 
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Much of the Board’s time was consumed with building relationships. While separate 
from the infrastructure districts, it worked with them to ensure that infrastructure 
supported its emerging vision of a polycentric region in which fully serviced urban 
areas were separate from rural lands. 
 
Jim Wilson worked closely with the municipal delegates on his board. Many of these 
served for considerable lengths of time—of the 183 people who served on the Board 
between 1949 and 1969, 55 served for four years or more. This built trust across 
municipal boundaries.  
 
Wilson and his staff also visited municipal councils and staff monthly. He also 
initiated a planning assistance program, whereby the Board prepared municipal plans 
and zoning bylaws on a fee-for-service basis. He later characterized planning 
assistance as a Trojan Horse strategy to build support for the idea of land-use 
regulation, and for the legitimacy of regional planning itself.  
 
More than once they were confronted by hostile crowds as they moved toward the 
adoption of an Official Regional Plan. While some municipal politicians and local 
business associations publicly protested the development of a region-wide zoning 
plan, only Langley District ultimately withheld consent. As the support of only two-
thirds of members were required, the official regional plan took effect in 1966.  
 
Provincial support was key. 
Minister Dan Campbell and 
Deputy Minister James Everett 
Brown exercised quiet suasion 
to bring municipalities on side.  
 
By the end of the 1960s, a half-
century of interaction through 
the infrastructure boards and 
20 years of cooperation on 
regional planning had 
cemented inter-municipal 
collaboration. Through this 
constructive engagement, local 
politicians and their staff came to see regional institutions and their activities as 
legitimate. 
 
This technical consensus on goals threatened to come undone in the early 1970s. As 
elsewhere in North America, ordinary people became increasingly skeptical of 
government and expert knowledge. Environmentalists framed urban development 
not as a positive by-product of economic growth, but as a harmful force to be 
contained.  
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To survive, regional planning would have to be seen as legitimate not simply by 
municipalities and political leaders, but also by the public at large.  
 
A new generation of planners at the 
GVRD, which had assumed 
authority over the regional plan, 
recognized that efficiency of land 
use was no longer a sufficient 
objective. To be legitimate, regional 
planning would have to appeal to 
the emotions and aspirations of 
ordinary people. 
 
To understand what people felt and 
believed, the visionary planning 
chief Harry Lash engaged in an 
unprecedented public engagement process. What they discovered through this 
process is that residents were concerned about growth as a threat to livability, and so 
the notion of preserving and enhancing livability became the hook on which 
planning would hang. 
 
At is that this stage that the regionalism’s legitimacy was put to the test. In 1983, the 
provincial government responded to economic recession with a radical program of 
austerity and deregulation. Regional planning was abolished and existing official 
regional plans were annulled. 
 
Despite its legal abolition, inter-municipal collaboration on matters of regional urban 
development continued, propelled by the strength of established relationships 
between municipal leaders and planning staff, many of whom had participated in the 
GVRD’s early 1970s planning efforts.  
 
This was kicked into high gear in 
the late 1980s, when Gordon 
Campbell and Ken Cameron 
aggressively built public and 
municipal support for a new 
regional planning vision—the 
Livable Region Strategic Plan. 
The mass outreach program was 
repeated, and the livability 
theme updated for a new 
generation.  
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In the mid-1990s, a new provincial government created a new statutory basis for 
planning, one that mandated municipal consensus on regional planning issues. In 
essence, the law codified a half-century and more of established collaborative 
practice.  
 
Now, as those in this room know, it was not all Kumbaya. At every stage, in the 
1960s, 70s, 80s, 90s, and 2000s, there have been very real disagreements and conflicts. 
The influence of regional institutions has ebbed and flowed over the decades. Like 
monsters in horror movies, the same conflicts keep coming back again and again—
over population and employment forecasts and land-use conversion, for example. 
 
As an outsider, what I find remarkable is not that there is conflict. What I find 
remarkable is that the system holds together at all. Decades later, the contours of the 
vision crafted by Jim Wilson and his staff in the 1950s and 1960s and updated by 
Harry Lash in the 1970s remain intact. This is because Greater Vancouver’s leaders 
have continued to reproduce the legitimacy of regionalism through constructive 
engagement with outside actors.  
The Portland story 
We can see similar dynamics in the Portland region. The emergence of regional 
cooperation and planning emerged only gradually in Portland and, compared to 
Vancouver, much more recently. Efforts to leverage federal mandates to create 
effective regional land-use and infrastructure coordination in the 1960s and 1970s 
were largely unsuccessful.  
 
A Metropolitan Service District was 
created in 1969 to consolidate the 
region’s patchwork of small water, 
sewer, and other service districts, but 
this never happened. The regional 
planning agency, called CRAG, was 
resented and resisted by member 
municipalities and counties. Much 
of the leverage CRAG had exercised 
over the shape of urban 
development disappeared when 
President Reagan abolished federal 
support for regional planning. 
 
Neither institution possessed much, if any, legitimacy on the basis of representation, 
interactions with stakeholders and the public, or outputs.  
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Their consolidation into an elected body in 1979, today’s Portland Metro, did nothing 
to increase the meagre legal authority and resources they possessed. Early failures did 
little to inspire trust and confidence. In its early days local pressure resulted in a 
permissive approach to the state-mandated urban growth boundary.  
 
From this inauspicious beginning, Portland Metro slowly gained legitimacy not 
primarily from being directly elected, but from a diligently pursued and multi-
pronged program of engagement with municipalities, interest groups, and the 
general public.  
 
Downtown business leaders saw regional planning as means of reversing downtown 
decline, while urban property developers came to appreciate the investment certainty 
provided by coordinated planning. Exurban farmers who were instinctively 
suspicious of land-use regulation saw benefit in rural land protection.  
 
Perhaps most importantly, the environmental group the 1000 Friends of Oregon 
became a vigorous funder of outside research and a defender of regional planning in 
the legislature and the courts. This carefully nurtured external support coalition 
insulated Portland Metro from challenge from an unpredictable state legislature and 
citizen-initiated challenges at the ballot.  
 
Metro also emerged as a convenor of local governments for long-term transportation 
planning, bringing municipal, county, and state officials, as well as TriMet, into 
routinized interaction.  
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Portland Metro leveraged its support coalition and 
role as an intergovernmental convenor to take on a more direct role in planning the 
region. Supported by Metro’s staff, committees of elected municipal officials and 
state agency representatives developed regional planning goals while simultaneously 
engaging the public through public meetings, focus groups, walking tours, a media 
campaign. The regional plan’s development also gained attention through the public 
advocacy of external proxies, including 1000 Friends.  
 
In the end, the Metro 2040 Growth Concept was successfully adopted in 1995, and its 
implementation has continued despite ongoing threats, because local governments 
were bound to the process, in effect co-designing the plan, and because Metro 
reinforced its legitimacy through the cultivation of outside support.  
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Conclusion: Legitimacy takes work 
These stories illustrate the importance of relationships to the legitimacy of regional 
institutions and activities, and therefore to their influence and effectiveness. While 
formal powers are important, their exercise is contingent on support from 
stakeholders and, ultimately, the public. Building legitimacy through interaction 
takes time and hard work. Metro Vancouver and Portland Metro work as well as they 
do because they have creatively elbowed their way in and actively navigated the 
conflicting interests of a diverse ecosystem of powerful actors.  
 
I say this as someone from Ontario, where the entire system of planning and 
infrastructure governance operates in a top-down, command-and-control fashion. 
The results are no better, because the system is virtually designed to create conflict 
among municipalities and between municipalities and the provincial government. 
The result has been a forty-year-long slow-burning legitimacy crisis in which 
everyone, and yet no one, is in charge.  
 
As the Toronto region continues to add 
100,000 new residents per year, its 
transportation infrastructure deficit is so 
profound that even today’s multi-billion 
dollar expansion projects will barely bend 
the transportation behaviour curve. 
Believe me, Vancouver, you’ve got it 
good.  
 
Let me conclude, then, with two observations. 
 
First, regionalists should never become complacent. Never believe that past successes 
will guarantee future ones. Legitimacy can only be sustained through active 
investment in productive relationships, open communication, and accountability.  
 
The recent failure of the transit funding referendum illustrates what happens when 
legitimacy ebbs, much as the development of the Livable Region Strategic Plan in the 
late 1980s shows that legitimacy can compensate for the absence of statutory 
authority. Crucially, popular support matters. Regardless of how institutions are set 
up, regionalism must engage the public, not just local governments and other formal 
stakeholders.  
 
Second, as I have observed the Vancouver region story from the outside, I am 
disappointed by the often antagonistic or obstructive behaviour of the provincial 
government. When you go through the ministerial files from the 1950s and 1960s in 
the archives, you find that the provincial government played a quiet enabling role, 
supporting regional problem-solving without engaging in direct coercion.  
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• When growing suburban municipalities refused to join the sewerage and 
drainage district in the 1950s, Minister Wesley Black created incentives that 
brought them on side.  
 
• When roughly seven Lower Mainland municipalities refused at the last 
minute to endorse the 1966 official regional plan, Minister Dan Campbell 
worked directly and through the Social Credit caucus to quietly bring them 
on side.  
 
• In the early- to mid-1970s, the provincial government applied quiet suasion to 
consolidate services into the new regional districts. 
 
Throughout, the province created the conditions for the region’s municipalities to 
help themselves. This was not simply benevolence. It was a deliberate political 
strategy. The province had no desire to bring itself into overt conflict with localism—
a conflict it could well lose. Like a judo master, it turned localism on itself, creating 
the conditions for localism to be accommodated to the regional perspective without 
compromising their accountability to their electors. 
 
Today’s problems are different from those of the 1950s and 1960s. Local and regional 
governments are now fully capable of collaboratively managing land use and 
operating infrastructure systems. The region’s actors no longer need to be persuaded 
of the benefits of regional planning. The broad contours of the land-use vision are 
broadly accepted. 
 
The core problem since the 1990s is how to support the land-use vision with costly up-
front investments in mobility systems, the scale of which is beyond the capacity of 
local governments. Once again, the region needs the province to be a constructive 
partner that creates and sustains the conditions for inter-municipal goal-setting and 
decision-making. But more than this, it needs the province to provide access to 
resources to make the expenditures the region needs.   
 
Unfortunately, the province has been a fair-weather friend since the 1980s, acting 
unilaterally to undermine regional institutions and decisions. The abolition of 
regional planning authority in 1983 may have strengthened the inter-municipal 
collaboration in the long run, but it also weakened the regulatory toolkit.  
 
Unilateral fiscal choices have undermined the integration of land-use and 
infrastructure planning: for example, the truncation of the Millennium Line and the 
widening of the Port Mann bridge.  
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Constituting TransLink separately from the GVRD also seems to me to be 
inconsistent with the region’s long-term institutional development. And vesting 
transportation planning in Translink rather than in the GVRD has severed the 
potential for a tight linkage between land-use and transportation planning and 
created new conflicts between rival bureaucracies.  
 
My recommendation to the province would be to take a lesson from its predecessors. 
Keep out of the weeds and avoid unnecessary political entanglements by supporting 
regional collaboration and providing resources. If the region’s municipalities want to 
work together to tax their residents for transit, let them—and let them be 
accountable for it.  
 
It has taken Greater Vancouver a century to evolve the regional planning and 
operating institutions it has today. These institutions embody an almost unique 
collaborative ethic that has legitimized the idea of the region, of regional plans and 
policies, of regional authority. Everyone’s task now, and especially the provincial 
government’s, should be to sustain and nurture this problem-solving capacity that has 
served Greater Vancouver so well, and for so long.  
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